Showing posts with label Manco Capac. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Manco Capac. Show all posts

Military Readiness of Peru and Chile

Throughout the developing conflict, many outside observers expressed opinions on the war preparations of both Peru and Chile. In general, observers felt that Peru was ill-prepared for war. It had suffered from years of political instability, and lacked a well-organized military force with a sufficient number of trained officers and modern equipment. A cultural divide between the highland cultures and the more international atmosphere of Lima added to the lack of unity of purpose.

Both countries recognized the importance of naval power, as both countries possessed long expanses of coastline with cities vulnerable to bombardment. Adding to this, coastal deserts created barriers to travel, and Peru needed better internal transportation both for commerce and defense.

Both countries began a build-up of arms. Ship builders and weapons manufacturers in both Europe and the hemisphere channeled war materials to both countries. Peru acquired the Independencia and the Huascar. They purchased monitors left idle at the close of the U.S. civil war, christened the Atahualpa and the Manco Capac. Peruvian naval officers received orders to inspect the warships in Callao. They found it necessary to put them in dry dock to examine and repair them. Piérola was allowed to return to Peru.


The historian Paz Soldan said that the Peruvian sailors lacked instruction and discipline, and failed to diligently pursue practice exercises, either through the lack of attention of commanders or the state of reparations in which they found themselves. Peru needed to recruit new crew members, because a major part of the navy seaman had been Chileans, so recently dismissed from service.

In Peru, recruits were not forthcoming. To fortify the armies, police drafted working class men. In March of 1879, the Peruvian military resorted to recruiting citizens by force and paying strong recruitment premiums to foreigners, such as Americans, Irish, Italians, and Ecuadorians. (Lopez, 1930, pg. 118)


Spenser St. John, British minister at Lima, saw in the ruling class only "ignorance or frivolity...on all sides, incapacity appears to be in possession of every important post...Peru appears struck as with paralysis: the people themselves seem as indifferent to the future as the governing classes." (Kiernan, V.G., 1955, pg. 19)

Chileans were "ethnically and culturally more unifed" than the Peruvians, and enjoyed a more stable government over the years. (Dobyns, 1976, p. 196) Their army and navy had modern equipment, including two new recently-purchased armored ships, the Almirante Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada.


Resources
Dobyns, Henry F. And Paul L. Doughty. 1976. Peru: a cultural history. New York, Oxford University. 336 pp.

Kiernan, V.G. 1955. “Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific” IN the Hispanic American Historical Review.

Lopez, Jacinto. 1930. Historia de la Guerra del Guano y el Salitre o Guerra del Pacifico entre Chile, Bolivia y El Peru. New York: De Laisne & Rossboro.

Charles R. Flint

Charles R. Flint was born in Maine, and was early drawn to the sea by his father Benjamin Flint Chapman, a partner in a shipbuilding company. He eventually moved with his family to Brooklyn, New York where, after attending school, he sought work.

As secretary for Jose Antonio Garcia y Garcia, the Minister of Peru to the United States, he helped buy and fit out three transports and two monitors (later christened the Atahualpa and the Manco Capac) (Flint, 1923) Captain Gilchrest escorted the monitors on their trip from New York to Peru in the steamship, the Maranon, arriving after many long sea miles at Callao in the fall of 1869. (Clayton, 1985)

Charles soon met and joined the firm of W.R. Grace, making two long trips to South America in 1874 and 1876. Assessing the value of various trade goods such as lard, canned goods, crackers, brooms, tobacco and nails, he identified Great Britain as a principal competitor. Charles grew to have a 25% interest in the W.R. Grace Company. This was later increased to 35%.

By 1879 he was serving as the Chilean consul in New York, still a partner in W.R. Grace and Co. (Flint, 1923) So when war came, he found himself on both sides of the war.

Resources:
Clayton, Lawrence. 1985. Grace: W.R. Grace & Co. The formative years 1850-1930. Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson. 403 pp.

Flint, Charles R. 1923. Memories of an active life: men and ships and sealing wax. Putnam. 349 pp.