Peru Under Siege

The Dictator Nicolás de Piérola's actions and decisions under the pressure of the extended crisis drew strong reactions from his contemporaries. A member of the foreign diplomatic corps, the British minister Spenser St. John, claimed that Piérola passed the "principal portion of his day in preparing decrees at which the public smile". Pierola's manifestos were "bombastic and absurd". (Kiernan, 1955, pg. 26) He "devoted his attentions to the organization of a torpedo brigade, and to the contrivance of engines for the destruction of the blockaded ships". (Markham, 1892)

Many reports in regard to torpedoes had been circulated, and Chileans were continually on the watch for them. Permanent moorings with buoys were laid down off the end of the island San Lorenzo to which the blockaders rode during the daylight hours. They set out each night, leaving two small vessels to guard the moorings. Two torpedo-boats were kept on patrol in the bay at night and during foggy weather these often ran close to the mole and among the foreign men-of-war. The Peruvians placed torpedos in the harbor, but not far out in the bay. For this work, they used several regular torpedo-boats, as well as launches and small tugs fitted up for torpedo work or patrol duty. They were also provided with torpedoes of the Lay system. One of the Herreshoff boats was run into the mole and sunk. (Mason, 1885)

Resources:
Kiernan, V.G. “Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific” IN the Hispanic American Historical Review, 1955.

Markham, Clements R. 1892. A history of Peru. Reprinted 1968. New York: Greenwood, 556 p.

Mason, Theodorus B. M. 1883. The War of the Pacific Coast of South America Between Chile and the Allied Republics of Peru and Bolivia. 1879-'81. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

1879 September

On September 3rd, Consul Marquez informed the Peruvian government that another Herreshoff torpedo boat acquired through the Grace company had arrived in Panama, coming from New York. He was worried that the authorities would confiscate the cargo. The government sent the Oroya to bring the munitions to Peru. (Yábar, 2001, p. 129)

On the 10th another Herreshoff torpedo of the the same type, completely armed and 70 feet in length arrived from the same source. Also reportedly arriving at approximately the same time were six Krupp cannons destined for Bolivia, three million rifle and machine gun munitions, 4500 rifles, 2 Nordefield machine guns and 40 conical steel shot for the squadron. The Oroya went to Panama to receive this cargo, entered directly to the port and loaded the armaments in Taboga. The Chileans objected strongly, but by the 23rd of September, the Oroya, with its cargo, departed from Panama headed towards Callao. (Yábar, 2001, p. 129)

Marquez expected a yacht torpedo and two more launches to arrive by the beginning of October, sent from New York by Canevaro, Vice President of the Republic. A torpedo launch arrived on the Ailza. Three naval officials went to Panama to await its arrival. The chief M. De la Barrera observed that it lacked navigation equipment and machinery. They believed that after it was tested in Europe, it was poorly attended. Rust had formed in all the parts that were not copper or bronze. Pistons, cylinders and condensers were rusted shut. It is possibly this launch that was captured by the Amazonas in Ballenita, a port in Ecuador.

Resources
Yábar Acuña, Francisco. 2001. Las Fuerzas Sutiles y la defensa de costa durante la Guerra del Pacifico. Lima: Dirección de Intereses Marítimos. 650 pp.

The Torpedo Men

In August 1879, the Chilean consul in Panama again protested the departure of the Limeña with torpedos for Peru. Chilean spies worked for the Panama railroad. It was almost impossible to secretly ship arms, because the Chileans knew when they would arrive on the other side of the isthmus.

By August, there were three groups of torpedo men from the U.S. in Peru: the Lay, the U.S. Torpedo Co., and the Herreshoff men. A "rowdy, hard-drinking lot", they drew their pay in gold, and consorted with ladies at the Callao waterfront.

On the 15th, the Chileans detained an armored torpedo boat leaving Pisagua for Iquique with four crew members under orders of Peru. The Chileans arrested them and placed them on board an armored ship the same day. The crew included William Alfred Scott, 41, the British commander of the vessel who had contracted the other members, Abraham Johnson of Jamaica, Cosem Espiro, 31, a Greek,and John Shertzer. a U.S. engineer. Before they were arrested, they threw overboard two booms 15 feet in length, each one with a torpedo full of dynamite. The government of Peru was paying them ten soles daily with the promise of paying them 10,000 soles for each armored Chilean ship that they sunk with their torpedos, through Casa Grace. They had made four large torpedos, capable of holding 200 pounds of dynamite, as well has two 90 pounds ones and four smaller ones of four pounds. They were also to earn 5000 soles for any wood boats they were able to sink. Their contract was time-limited, and extended two months from the time they left Callao. (Lopez, 1930, pg. 307, 308)

On the 20th, Charles W. Read, an ex-confederate recruited by Charles Flint, sailed for Peru. During the Civil War, Read commanded a Confederate torpedo squadron on the Mississippi River. Read brought with him an engineer, John H. Smith. After previously testing torpedos in Narragansett Bay, they followed the munitions down and across the isthmus and to Peru. The Peruvian Navy commissioned Read as a commander and offered him a substantial amount of prize money if they sunk the principal Chilean war ships.

A dispute arose amongst the Peruvian officers, when they heard that a prize would be awarded to Read for sinking the Chilean ships. The naval commandant at Callao told Read that no prize money would be forthcoming, so Read headed back to the United States. W. R. Grace was disgusted with this handling of affairs and felt the torpedo men had made a poor use of the weapons.

Resources
Lopez, Jacinto. 1930. Historia de la Guerra del Guano y el Salitre o Guerra del Pacifico entre Chile, Bolivia y El Peru. New York: De Laisne & Rossboro.

Arms Shipments Under U.S. Neutrality

The World Book of 1952 said that "no important problems in foreign relations arose" during the administration of Rutherford B. Hayes. He and his Secretary of State, William Evarts, are said to have maintained an outwardly neutral stance toward the war. Some said that the Europeans welcomed the war, as they had endured a long period without seeing any return on their capital nor interest in their debt. Their interests were more aligned with Chile, also a debtor, but not to the extent that Peru had reached.

After the Civil War, American military forces were downsized and ex-military officers looked for new opportunities. Peru sought foreign expertise and munitions developed during that war. A young Union naval engineer named John Louis Lay made what is known as a spar torpedo, an explosive charge on the end of a pole twenty or thirty feet long. After the war, Lay became a torpedo manufacturer and developed a new torpedo that could be sent against a target a mile away. The United States Torpedo Co. manufactured a somewhat similar instrument.

For use with these torpedos, Navy officers preferred a small boat made by the shipbuilding firm of Herreshoff of Bristol, Rhode Island. Grace took a ride on one in Long Island Sound. He decided that the only thing to save Peru was torpedo launches, and bought it for $18,500, billing the craft to the Compañía Cargadora del Perú, guano dealers of Callao.

The boat was 50 foot in length. It was difficult to disguise, so delivery to Peru was problematic. It is implied that the purchase of two steamers by the Peruvian government from the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. was required to effect the delivery of this boat and five others. Herreshoff boats were shipped in sections as "carriages" all ready to bolt and put back together. The first launch arrived in Peru in August of 1879.

Grace, acting as an agent of Peru, sent several torpedos and torpedo boats to Peru along with experts from the two companies. W.W. Rowley of the Lay Company went down to direct the proposed plan, traveling under the name of H. J. Patchen.

Meanwhile, Charles Flint wrapped torpedos in oil cloth and sent a thousand rifles masquerading as agricultural equipment to Peru. Flint decided that by shipping through Colombia, they could avoid having to cross Panama, where there was likelihood that the munitions would fall into the hands of the Chileans. Ten dirigible torpedos from Pratt and Whitney were slipped into the center of ten cases of oil-cloth.

Flint determined that oilcloth shipped by itself weighed about the same as two layers of oilcloth with a torpedo inside. "Peru did a surprisingly large business in oilcloth during those days" Cartridges surrounded by lard were sent in lard barrels. (Flint, 1923)

Resources
Flint, Charles R. 1923. Memories of an active life: men and ships and sealing wax. Putnam. 349 pp.