Throughout the developing conflict, many outside observers expressed opinions on the war preparations of both Peru and Chile. In general, observers felt that Peru was ill-prepared for war. It had suffered from years of political instability, and lacked a well-organized military force with a sufficient number of trained officers and modern equipment. A cultural divide between the highland cultures and the more international atmosphere of Lima added to the lack of unity of purpose.
Both countries recognized the importance of naval power, as both countries possessed long expanses of coastline with cities vulnerable to bombardment. Adding to this, coastal deserts created barriers to travel, and Peru needed better internal transportation both for commerce and defense.
Both countries began a build-up of arms. Ship builders and weapons manufacturers in both Europe and the hemisphere channeled war materials to both countries. Peru acquired the Independencia and the Huascar. They purchased monitors left idle at the close of the U.S. civil war, christened the Atahualpa and the Manco Capac. Peruvian naval officers received orders to inspect the warships in Callao. They found it necessary to put them in dry dock to examine and repair them. Piérola was allowed to return to Peru.
The historian Paz Soldan said that the Peruvian sailors lacked instruction and discipline, and failed to diligently pursue practice exercises, either through the lack of attention of commanders or the state of reparations in which they found themselves. Peru needed to recruit new crew members, because a major part of the navy seaman had been Chileans, so recently dismissed from service.
In Peru, recruits were not forthcoming. To fortify the armies, police drafted working class men. In March of 1879, the Peruvian military resorted to recruiting citizens by force and paying strong recruitment premiums to foreigners, such as Americans, Irish, Italians, and Ecuadorians. (Lopez, 1930, pg. 118)
Spenser St. John, British minister at Lima, saw in the ruling class only "ignorance or frivolity...on all sides, incapacity appears to be in possession of every important post...Peru appears struck as with paralysis: the people themselves seem as indifferent to the future as the governing classes." (Kiernan, V.G., 1955, pg. 19)
Chileans were "ethnically and culturally more unifed" than the Peruvians, and enjoyed a more stable government over the years. (Dobyns, 1976, p. 196) Their army and navy had modern equipment, including two new recently-purchased armored ships, the Almirante Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada.
Resources
Dobyns, Henry F. And Paul L. Doughty. 1976. Peru: a cultural history. New York, Oxford University. 336 pp.
Kiernan, V.G. 1955. “Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific” IN the Hispanic American Historical Review.
Lopez, Jacinto. 1930. Historia de la Guerra del Guano y el Salitre o Guerra del Pacifico entre Chile, Bolivia y El Peru. New York: De Laisne & Rossboro.
On April 2nd, 1879, the Chilean congress authorized war and on April 5th the declaration of war was made, giving the Chilean squadron the time to reach Callao. However, the Chilean plan did not come to fruition as planned.
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